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People v. Rojas: The Expanding Concept of Unavailability
INTRODUCTION
California has recognized the subsequent unavailability of a
witness as an adequate foundation for the introduction of his
former testimony. This evidentiary rule arises from a statutory
exception to the hearsay rule.' The American Law Institute has
promulgated a uniform rule of evidence on this exception which
has been approved by the United States Supreme Court 2 and ap-
plied by some federal courts.8 Although an assertable defense to the
use of prior testimony of an unavailable witness might be a denial
of the constitutional right of confrontation, such a result is obviated
in California where the statutory exception is limited to situa-
tions in which the contestant, "had the right and opportunity to
cross-examine" with a substantially similar motive in the former
proceeding.4 Further, California case law has established that the
1. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part:(a) Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and:(1) The former testimony is offered against a person who offered
it in evidence in his own behalf on the former occasion or against
the successor in interest of such person; or (2) The party against
whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or
proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right
and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest
and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.
2. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE § 804 (West 1975) which the Supreme
Court prescribed prior to adoption provides in pertinent part: "(a) Defini-
tion of unavailability. 'Unavailable as a witness' includes situations in
which the declarant: 1 ) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground
of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement;
2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his state-
ment despite an order of the court to do so; 3) testifies to a lack of memory
of the subject matter . . .; 4) is unable to be present or to testify at the
hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or in-
firmity; or 5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance (or testimony) by process or
other reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his
exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due
to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the
purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying." This sec-
tion became part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective Jan. 1, 1976.
3. United States v. Brasco, 385 F. Supp. 964, 966 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291 (West 1970). For text see note 1, supra.
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right of cross-examination and confrontation is fully satisfied when
such right existed at the preliminary examination.5 Therefore, the
focus of this note will be the potential hearsay objections to use
of former testimony.
Perhaps the most difficult task the courts have encountered in
applying this exception is determining what constitutes unavail-
ability under the applicable statute. The trial court has enjoyed
wide discretion in construing the concept of unavailability, since
it is in the most advantageous position to view and balance the
equities of the situation.6 The determination must be made whether
the unavailability is so incurable as to necessitate admission of prior
testimony against a contestant who might be unprepared for this
contingency. Indeed, necessity is the underlying policy for this
hearsay exception. 7 So conceding, the California Court of Appeal
in People v. Gomez," stated that a physical condition rendering a
witness unavailable must make it substantially impossible, not
merely inconvenient, for the court to obtain his present testimony.
Although the severity of the condition was deemed the most impor-
tant factor in deciding if necessity dictated receiving prior testi-
mony, no ironclad rules were enunciated as to just what constituted
sufficient infirmity for finding the witness unavailable. Rather, the
issue was reserved for determination by the trial court: "However,
we cannot say just what illness or infirmity must be shown or the
degree of its severity, leaving that determination to a trial court's
exercise of discretion."9
This wide latitude given to trial judges, while providing flex-
ibility, serves to defeat achievement of any degree of uniformity.
Although certain categories of unavailability, such as the subse-
quent death of the witness' 0 or the inability to secure his presence
within the jurisdiction," are invariably accepted, there exists
5. People v. Hernandez, 263 Cal. App. 2d 242, 252, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448,
454 (1968) and authority therein cited.
6. Rutledge v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 675 (9th Cir.
1975). Sanchez v. Baques & Sons Mortuaries, 271 Cal. App. 2d 188, 193-
94, 76 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375-76 (1969).
7. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE 1402 (3d ed. 1974).
8. 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1972).
9. Id. at 230, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
10. Howard v. State, 49 Ala. App. 548, 274 S.2d 104 (1973); People v.
Burton, 6 Ill. App. 3d 879, 286 N.E.2d 792 (1972).
11. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE 1404 (3d ed. 1974).
little consensus among authorities as to when unavailability other-
wise exists. 12 Perhaps sensing this, 'California enacted Section 240
of the Evidence Code' 3 delineating the categories of unavailability
necessary for admission of prior testimony. However, the statute
does not expressly deal with the effect of the witness' subsequent
refusal to testify.
An early split of authority developed in the various state courts
whether to recognize a witness' subsequent refusal to testify as
rendering his present testimony unavailable. 1 4  The Michigan
court held that such a refusal constituted unavailability where the
witness declined to testify due to a subsequent fear of self-incrim-
ination even though he was granted immunity. 15 In contrast,
the Wisconsin courts' held that under a grant of immunity
the witness could be compelled to testify and, thus, could not be
termed unavailable. Although the state could use the prior testi-
mony for impeachment purposes,
[t]his, however, does not authorize the substitution by reading of
that testimony for the testimony of the witness who was present
in court. . . . Where a witness for the state becomes hostile and
refuses voluntarily to give the testimony which he is capable of,
it places a great hardship upon the prosecution. This, however,
does not justify disregard of the rights [e.g., to have a fair trial
free from prejudicial error] of the defendant in order to overcome
the state's difficulty. The trial court had the duty and facilities to
compel Russell to testify.' 7
The federal courts have also grappled with the effect of a subse-
quent refusal to testify. In Mason v. United States' s the defendant
was charged with the importation and sale of heroin. Four wit-
12. United States v. Brasco, 385 F. Supp. 964, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
13. CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part:
(a) 'unavailable as a witness' means that the declarant is: 1)
Exempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the matter to which his statement is relevant; 2) Dis-
qualified from testifying to the matter; 3) Dead or unable to attend
or to testify at the hearing because of then existing physical or
mental ilness or infirmity; 4) Absent from the hearing and the
court is unable to compel his attendance by its process; or 5)
Absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has
exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his
attendance by the court's process. (b) A declarant is not unavail-
able as a witness if the exemption, preclusion, disqualification,
death, inability, or absence of the declarant was brought about by
the procurement or wrong-doing of the proponent of his state-
ment for the purpose of preventing the declarant from attending or
testifying. (This section superceded and repealed Section 1870 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.)
14. 29 AM. Jun. 2d, Evidence § 759 (1967).
15. People v. Picket, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954). Cert. denied
349 U.S. 937 (1955).
16. Pleau v. State, 255 Wis. 362, 38 N.W.2d 496 (1949).
17. Id. at 366, 38 N.W.2d at 498.
18. 408 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1969); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971).
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nesses testified at the first trial but, after an appeal, refused to tes-
tify at the second trial on Fifth Amendment grounds. Even though
a grant of immunity invalidated this constitutional assertion, three
persisted in their refusal to testify again. After citing them for
contempt, the court allowed the government to introduce their
former testimony. Finding that the trial court had exhausted all
available possibilities before finding the declarants unavailable, the
reviewing court ruled "that the trial judge was not in error in per-
mitting the use of the witness' testimony at the prior trial under
the circumstances and the manner he did."'19 Mason established
a federal precedent which the federal district courts in the Tenth
Circuit were bound to follow even if such precedent conflicted with
state law. 20  It was later held that a witness' "silence in reliance,
albeit misplaced, upon Fifth Amendment rights, makes him no less
unavailable than death or absence from the country or physical
inability to speak. ' '21 Mason has been generally followed in sub-
sequent circuit court decisions. 22  Supporting the Mason trend
is the Uniform Rules of Evidence which provides that a witness
who "persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter
of his statement despite an order of the court to do so," is unavail-
able.23 Thus, the Uniform Rules explicitly provide for the silent
witness whereas the California Evidence Code does not.
THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE
California enacted Section 240 of the Evidence Code hoping to
avoid the conflicting decisions in this area. It prescribes when
provisions of the Evidence Code,24 the Penal Code,25 and the
19. Id. at 906.
20. United States v. Brasco, 385 F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
21. United States v. Mobley, 421 F.2d 345, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1970).
22. United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Wilcox, 450 F.2d 1131, 1138 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Milano,
443 F.2d 1022, 1029 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Allen, 409 F.2d 611,
613 (10th Cir. 1969).
23. See, supra note 2.
24. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1230 (declaration against interest), § 1251 (declar-
ant's statement as to his previously-existing mental state), § 1291 (former
testimony of declarant), § 1293 (former testimony of a nonparty), § 1310
(statements of declarant's own family history), § 1311 (family history of
another), § 1323 (statement concerning boundary of land) (West 1970).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1345 (deposition in a criminal trial), § 1362
(deposition taken under authority of commission) (West 1970).
Code of Civil Procedure26 dealing with admission of former testi-
mony of an unavailable witness apply. However, it does not
explicitly provide for the situation involving an outright refusal
to testify.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed itself to the appli-
cation of Section 240 in Rutledge v. Electric Hose and Rubber Co. 2 7
The court refused to find government witnesses unavailable and
thereby denied admission of their former trial transcripts by relying
on the district court's wide discretion: "The record discloses that
the district court took the unavailability status of the witnesses...
on a one-to-one basis, and in each instance, found that Rutledge
had not exercised 'reasonable diligence' within the meaning of Sec-
tion 240 (a) (5) of the California Evidence Code. ' 28 The trial
court's methodology was not questioned or disapproved. Thus,
while the criteria establishing unavailability are codified, substan-
tial trial court discretion is acceptable to the appellate court.29
Yet, once again the appellate level failed to provide standards with
which to measure the scope of statutory unavailability. It was
imperative that a court decide whether a non-privileged witness'
refusal to testify would fall within the bounds of Section 240 so
as to render him "unavailable." The California Supreme Court
established the essential precedent in People v. Rojas.30
THE CASE
Defendants Rojas and Ramirez were convicted of assault with a
deadly weapon in two counts. An essential prosecution witness,
Navarrette, was a co-passenger in the automobile driven by defend-
ant Rojas. He testified at the preliminary hearing and at the first
trial of defendants. After being granted immunity, Navarrette
testified that he saw Ramirez actually firing a shot. However, after
the jury was unable to render a verdict and a second trial was
set, Navarrette refused to testify. In an in camera hearing Navar-
rette declared that he had been subjected to threats of bodily harm
and that his family had suffered from the vandalism of its property.
He further stated that he harbored great fear for his family's safety
and therefore, intimidated by possible future danger, he felt com-
pelled to refuse to testify. Despite being threatened with contempt
26. CAL. CODE OF CIv. PRO. § 2016(d) (3) (use of prior depositions in a
civil trial) (West 1970).
27. 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975).
28. Id. at 675.
29. Id.
30. 15 Cal. 3d 540, 542 P.2d 229, 125 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1975).
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he remained silent; he was thereafter incarcerated. The trial court
allowed his prior testimony to be read at the second trial, relying
on two grounds: 1) His refusal to testify constituted an implied
denial of his prior testimony and the latter could be admitted pur-
suant to Evidence Code Section 1235 as a prior inconsistent state-
ment,31 and 2) His refusal to testify rendered him unavailable as
a witness pursuant to Section 240 of the Evidence Code. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on the
former ground,32 but after disposing of a collateral issue3 3 they
considered the issue of Navarrette's unavailability.
UNAVAILABILITY
Since Navarrette was not absent or disqualified and his refusal
was not privileged,3 4 the reviewing Court concluded that only sub-
division (a) (3) of Section 240 of the Evidence Code could possibly
apply. This subdivision states, "unavailable as a witness means
that the declarant is: . .. (3) Dead or unable to attend or to testify
at the hearing because of then existing physical or mental illness
or infirmity.135 A close examination of subsection (3) allows it
31. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1970). The prior testimony could be
used as substantive, as well as impeaching, evidence. California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
32. Defendants contended that Navarrette's refusal could not be con-
strued as a prior inconsistent statement that would invoke section 1235 of
the Evidence Code. The reviewing court agreed and ruled that the word-
ing, "Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at
the hearing . . ." compelled the result that Navarrette's prior testimony
could not be used when he did not testify at the present hearing where the
admissibility question arose.
33. Rojas had contended that there was proof that the jury had not con-
sidered his individual guilt or innocence but, rather, had remained dead-
locked on Ramirez's guilt alone. Rojas requested that he be allowed to en-
ter a plea of "once in jeopardy" because the discharge of a jury without
a verdict barred a retrial unless the defendant had consented or a legal ne-
cessity existed. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1140 (West 1970). This request was
deemed without merit because the trial court could, and did, determine le-
gal necessity based on reasonable probabilities. The defendants were so
connected as to preclude a verdict against one without a verdict as to the
other. Viewing all factors before it, and granted its sound discretion, there
was no abuse of trial court discretion.
34. The trial court grant of immunity precluded a 5th Amendment re-
fusal.
35. See, supra note 13.
to be segmented into two components. The first component
requires the declarant to possess a specific status. He must be
"dead" or "unable to attend or to testify." The second component
demands that this status must be caused by one of the named con-
ditions. The inability to obtain present testimony must be because
of a present "physical or mental illness or infirmity." Logically,
without establishing both of these components this limited sub-
division should not be applied.
The Court dealt exclusively with the second component, the
causation factor. On this point the state contended that, "the term
'mental infirmity' includes a mental state induced by fear which
impels the witness to refuse to testify." The Court agreed and ruled
that Navarrette's fear for safety constituted a mental infirmity with-
in the meaning of Section 240 (a) (3). They found Webster's defini-
tion of "infirmity"3 6 applicable to this situation. This decision that
extreme fear can constitute mental infirmity appears justified.
However this satisfies only the second component, the causation
factor, leading to the witness' status. The Court proceeded not only
to find that Navarrette's fear constituted a mental infirmity but
further found that he should be categorized as unavailable. It is
interesting to note how they dealt with the first component, the
declarant's present status.
The Court noted that this situation was one of first impression
because Navarrette was not only present but both "physically and
mentally able to testify" [emphasis added]. By making this latter
observation the Court appears to have placed its application of the
statute on weak ground. It seems to have ignored the requisite
first component of the narrow subdivision, the declarant's present
inability to testify. Unless the witness is first established to be
dead or unable to testify, consideration of the cause of that status
would appear to be premature. Granted, extreme fear can con-
stitute a "mental infirmity" and thus satisfy the second statutory
component. Yet the primary component, the witness' inability to
testify, is equally important. Since the Court conceded availability
it invalidated this primary component and apparently exceeded the
scope of the statute. In all probability the Court was attempting to
ascertain the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.
Possibly the use of the phrase "able to testify" was inadvertent
and was not intended to disallow the admission of prior testimony
in the type of factual situation present in Rojas. The resulting rule
36. "Infirmity: a defect of personality or weakness of the will." WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966).
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elevates substance over form and significantly extends the statute's
application to this recurrent situation.
In applying Section 240 the Court noted that the statute was
designed to retain the prior recognized situations of unavailability,
as well as to expand that definition. Indeed, the Legislative Com-
ment to Section 1291 of the Evidence Code, which allows prior testi-
mony to be used where the declarant is presently unavailable, and
which was applied, indicated an attempt to broaden the scope of
unavailability: "Section 1291 will also permit a broader range of
hearsay to be introduced against the defendant in a criminal action
than has been permitted under Penal Code Section 686.2'3 In
interpreting the legislative intent, the Court drew an analogy
between a person asserting a legitimate privilege and one who
harbors a legitimate fear for his safety. Noting that the former
is expressly delineated by statute while the latter is not, the Court
discussed the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.8 It con-
cluded that the maxim would give way where it would operate
contrary to the legislative intent. The Court interpreted the legis-
lative intent to include non-privileged refusals to testify within the
definition of unavailability.
REQUIREMENT OF CORROBORATION
The only case which the California Supreme Court noted in
reference to a mental illness or infirmity was People v. Gomez.39
There a minor female complainant testified at the preliminary hear-
ing but not at the trial. Two staff psychiatrists at the state
hospital where she was confined testified that her appearance in
court would be traumatic and extremely detrimental to her mental
recovery. The Court allowed her preliminary hearing testimony
to be read after finding her unavailable.
The Gomez Court distinguished the authorities cited by defendant
from the cases cited by the state. In People v. Bojorquez40 the
37. LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE COMMENT § 1291 (Assembly Journal, April
6, 1965). CAL. PENAL CODE § 686 allows introduction of hearsay to the extent
allowable under state law to qualify as an exception to the criminal defend-
ant's right of confrontation.
38. "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
39. 26 Cal. App. 3d 225, 103 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1972).
40. 55 Cal. 463 (1880). Defendant had used this authority.
witness was found to be available since the only witness testifying
was the under-sheriff who testified that the witness was "unwell
and not able to leave his room"41 for the trial. In People v. Rine-
Smith42 the trial court was reversed when it based its finding of
unavailability on a police officer's testimony that the witness was
too ill to attend the trial. Both of these case decisions rested on
the lack of independant expert testimony as to the infirmity. In
one of the more controlling cases, People v. Hernandez,43 a licensed
physician testified that declarant had been in an accident, was
expected to be unconscious indefinitely, and was certain to sustain
permanent brain damage. Similarly, in People v. King44 a licensed
doctor testified that declarant was unavailable due to cerebral
thrombosis. In the latter two cases the trial court was held justi-
fied in basing its finding of unavailability on medical testimony.
It can be seen that the Gomez Court placed great emphasis on the
weight of independent corroborative evidence.
The Rojas Court failed to mention this important distinction.
Gomez intimated that independent expert testimony was crucial
in corroborating a claim of unavailability. In Rojas the only evi-
dence adduced in this respect was Navarrette's own statement. His
opinion certainly lacked the weight of an independent witness'
assessment. A strong burden of proof as to unavailability should
properly be placed on the party seeking the admission of the prior
testimony. The appellate ruling in Sanchez v. Bagues & Sons
Mortuaries45 sustained this position. When faced with a situation
markedly similar to Rojas46 the court stated:
Unavailability of the witness was a preliminary fact to be estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the trial court by the proponent of the
evidence .... There was no testimony of a doctor or a nurse that
the witness could not appear in court. . . . [Ilt was encumbent
upon counsel to establish the unavailability of the witness to the
satisfaction of the court. . . . Houghten's deposition testimony
concerning his disability could not be considered at all on the ques-
tion of the disability as of the time of trial, because to do so would
be 'pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps,' 47
In approving the exercise of the lower courts' discretion, both
the Sanchez Court and the Gomez Court were notably impressed
41. Id. at 464.
42. 40 Cal. App. 2d 786, 105 P.2d 1021 (1940). Defendant had relied on
this also.
43. People v. Hernandez, 263 Cal. App. 2d 242, 69 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968).
44. People v. King, 269 Cal. App. 2d 40, 74 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1969).
45. 271 Cal. App. 2d 188, 76 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1969).
46. A deponent had sought to establish his unavailability by his own
statements regarding his physical condition.
47. 271 Cal. App. 2d 188, 193-94, 76 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1969).
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with reliance on independent corroborative evidence before un-
availability was established. Similarly, the Sanchez Court specifi-
cally frowned on the proponent's attempts to sustain his burden
of proof by his own testimony. Although no explicit guidelines
were enunciated in Sanchez that require independent corroboration,
the appellate court characterized the proponent's attempts to pro-
ceed without it as "pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps."
The very crucial point which the Gomez and Sanchez cases turned
upon was ignored in Rojas. The propriety of the prosecution's use
of the prior testimony of Navarrette based only on his assertion
of his own mental infirmity was not questioned. Perhaps the state
in Rojas was "pulling itself up by its own bootstraps" in failing
to present some independent evidence to substantiate Navarrette's
claim.
The reliance on Navarrette's preliminary examination testimony
was possibly prejudicial to Rojas. The preliminary examination is
limited to the issue of probable cause and ordinarily neither party
discloses the full merits of his case. If only one party anticipates
a witness' subsequent silence he will elicit as much testimony as
possible while the disadvantaged party may defer detailed cross-
examination until the trial date. Perhaps the state in Rojas used
its foresight of future peer group pressure on Navarrette to elicit
incriminating testimony at the earliest opportunity. Obviously it
had the facilities of law enforcement at its disposal making possible
early knowledge of Navarrette's subsequent silence. Apparently
defendant lacked that foresight because he was the one contesting
the admission of the preliminary hearing transcripts. If defense
counsel had anticipated this key witness' subsequent silence he
could have used the preliminary examination as a "full-dress hear-
ing" and conducted a comprehensive cross-examination that would
have rendered objection to use of that transcript unnecessary.
Requiring a strong burden of proof from the party seeking admis-
sion of the unavailable witness' testimony is crucial in minimizing
the potential prejudice in this situation of a self-proclaimed "un-
available" witness. It is unjust to the unprepared party to allow
this burden to be sustained by solely relying upon the witness' own
testimony to establish statutory unavailability. The better solution
is the requirement of independent corroboration.
As discussed previously, the Gomez Court and Sanchez Court
approved the use of independent corroborative evidence to demon-
strate both the existence of a mental or physical infirmity and the
complete lack of alternative methods to render the witness able
to testify. The Court in Rojas failed to require any showing by
independent corroboration that there was no remedy available to
ameliorate Navarrette's fear, either by implementation of police pro-
tection or relocation of the witness into a different environment.
Although the California Supreme Court was not bound by Gomez
it was the only case relied upon and approved in Rojas. Further,
Gomez relied on the Sanchez reasoning regarding independent cor-
roborative evidence. It would seem that by once again -placing
emphasis on trial court discretion and failing to establish a require-
ment beyond the mere assertion of a declarant, the California Su-
preme Court has departed from the sensible trend that the appellate
levels had established.
BALANCING THE INTERESTS
Finally, the Rojas Court rationalized that undesirable conse-
quences would result if a witness' testimony could be rendered
unavailable by threats. Yet, the Wisconsin rationale seems equally
palpable: "This, however, does not justify disregard of the rights
of defendant in order to overcome the state's difficulty. '48 It
appears that any defendant could be prejudiced by a witness' subse-
quent refusal to testify. For, although the letter of the constitu-
tional right of confrontation would be satisfied, certainly the spirit
would be violated if large-scale refusals of material witnesses were
utilized in a routine manner. Although the difference in scope
between a preliminary hearing and a trial is not such as to destroy
the right of confrontation if preliminary cross-examination was
available,49 it is certain that strategy would be altered if it became
apparent that a witness would subsequently refuse to testify.
Viewing the situation from this perspective, the possible inequi-
ties on both sides seem equal. Undoubtedly, the Rojas Court placed
great reliance on subdivision (b) of Section 240 '10 which prevents
an unavailability finding if it is procured by the proponent of the
prior testimony. This safeguard is deemed adequate by the Court
and it was found inapplicable in Rojas. This decision should pro-
vide notice to all litigants who might suffer from the possibility
of a subsequent reluctant witness to place greater emphasis on
48. Pleau v. State, 255 Wis. 362, 366, 38 N.W.2d 496, 498 (1949).
49. People v. King, 269 Cal. App. 2d 40, 46, 74 Cal. Rptr. 679, 685(1969).
50. CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West 1970). For text see, supra note 13.
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primary proceedings so as to mitigate the possibility of future
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Because Section 240 (a) (3) might not literally apply in light of
the Court's threshold finding that Navarette was physically able
to testify, Rojas seems to be a judicially-enacted extension of this
hearsay exception. The "exception" now specifically includes non-
privileged refusals to testify. Be it extension or legislative inter-
pretation, the decision provides much-needed uniformity to this
gray area. Further, it follows the federal trend as enunciated in
Section 804 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence which explicitly pro-
vides for such a situation.51 Section 240 was intended to "substi-
tute a uniform standard for the varying standards of unavailability
S. 52 but, as explained, it left an important gap that frequently
appeared. The California Supreme Court filled that gap in Rojas.
One foreseeable result of the decision concerns the difficulty
encountered in responding to a mental or emotional claim of justi-
fiable fear. How can an adversary defeat a witness' claim of fear?
It is conceivable that he might be forced to contend with deliberate
subterfuge which only appears after the possibility of adequate
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing had been waived until
the actual trial. The only remedy lies in proving the unavailability
status was procured by the proponent. However, the extent to
which a court would be influenced by allegations of fraud and the
amount of proof required remains to be seen.
A possible new direction could be a legislative enactment of a
statute similar to Section 804 (a) (2) of the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence which encompasses the situation.53 It would be desirable
to add a requirement of independent corroborating evidence to
support a claim of unavailability. Although expert testimony
might be difficult to obtain in certain circumstances, it would not
be burdensome to require the trial courts to exact a stricter bur-
den of proof than the declarant's statements alone. The unavail-
51. TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO THE UNI-
FORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (Article VIII Hearsay Evidence), 6 CAL. LAW RE-
VISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES APPENDIX at 411, note 7 (1964).
52. See, supra note 2.
53. For text see, supra note 2.
able witness' statements of fear could be corroborated by either
testimony of other witnesses or by circumstantial evidence. This
would impose no undue burden on the truly unavailable witness
yet would circumvent ungrounded claims by a reluctant declarant.
The judicial dedication to basic rights of a litigant or defendant
should require no less. A good faith showing of justified fear
should be required before an unavailable status is established.
Yet, California courts now possess a uniform standard on the
issue of unavailability caused by a witness' non-privileged refusal
to testify. It has been established that not only can fear constitute
mental infirmity, it may render him "unavailable" within the mean-
ing of Section 240 of the Evidence Code. It should be interesting
to note the spectrum of cases which will appear delineating the
outer bounds of what degree of fear is required to lead to a finding
of a mental infirmity. But for now the door has been opened.
Brian Wade Uhl
